Tuesday, September 6, 2022

Apparently NASA Forgot How to Work With Liquid Hydrogen

The persistent issues that have been arising with trying to fuel Artemis I for its maiden flight are drawing attention to an awkward conclusion.  Either the contractors for Artemis and whoever is running Mission Control forgot how to work with liquid hydrogen or everyone who knew how to do it has retired or otherwise left the business.  There's a simple root cause, though, embedded in the joke that the SLS is "the Shuttles' Leftover Shit."  The Shuttle program had trouble with liquid H2 as well and since the SLS program is reusing the Space Shuttle Main Engines, they have to use Hydrogen and Oxygen just like the Shuttles did.

Over its lifetime, due to this complexity, the shuttle on average scrubbed nearly once every launch attempt. Some shuttle flights scrubbed as many as five times before finally lifting off. For launch controllers, it never really got a whole lot easier to manage the space shuttle's complex fueling process, and hydrogen was frequently a culprit.

There's a famous quote attributed to SF author Harlan Ellison that the two most common elements in the universe are hydrogen and stupidity.  Here we appear to be seeing both.  Hydrogen is the lightest and smallest element, with the most common form being simply one proton with one 1S electron orbiting it.  Molecular hydrogen is two of these atoms bonded together (it's called H2 after all) with a cloud of both electrons enveloping both protons.  Because they're so tiny, hydrogen molecules can squeeze through the smallest of gaps. That's not a big deal at ambient temperatures and pressures, but in the super-cold and high pressure conditions of liquid hydrogen fuel, the molecules easily ooze through any available opening. 

The hardware that fuels any rocket is complex.  The pipes have to be very cold to keep too much liquid fuel from evaporating, and in the case of liquid H2 that means less than -425 F. The pipes and joints shrinking as they chill and expanding as they warm add complexity, but the most complex part is that the vehicle must be refilled - "topped off" - continuously and the "quick disconnect" (QD) lines must disconnect within tenths of a second of ignition.  The temperature of the pipes compounds the difficulty.  One of the things you'll read about the Artemis issues over the weekend is that controllers would let the QD lines warm up and hope they'd naturally settle into a position that sealed better.  

Oh, yeah.  There's another problem.  Hydrogen is explosive; I mean that's why they use it as rocket fuel, right?  

NASA, therefore, has a tolerance for a small amount of hydrogen leakage. Anything above a 4 percent concentration of hydrogen in the purge area near the quick disconnect, however, is considered a flammability hazard. "We were seeing in excess of that by two or three times that," said Mike Sarafin, NASA's Artemis I mission manager, of Saturday's hydrogen leak. "It was pretty clear we weren’t going to be able to work our way through it. Every time we saw a leak, it pretty quickly exceeded our flammability limits."

And one story that makes my head hurt:

NASA officials are still assessing the cause of the leak, but they believe it may have been due to an errant valve being opened. This occurred during the process of chilling down the rocket prior to loading liquid hydrogen. Amid a sequence of about a dozen commands being sent to the rocket, a command was sent to a wrong valve to open. This was rectified within 3 or 4 seconds, Sarafin said. However, during this time, the hydrogen line that would develop a problematic quick-disconnect was briefly over-pressurized.

Here, we circle back to a reasonable question.  If hydrogen is so hard to work with and hard to handle compared to kerosene (RP-1) or methane, why use it?  Back to the first paragraph: when congress allocated funds to start the program they mandated the use of the Shuttle hardware.  At this point, it might add some perspective to consider much of the Shuttle hardware was designed around 45 years ago.  Asked about whether using it was good idea, NASA Administrator Bill Nelson, who was one of the architects of the SLS as a jobs program said, "We deferred to the experts."  That is, those with an interest in saying to do it that way.

Among the idea's opponents was Lori Garver, who served as NASA's deputy administrator at the time. She said the decision to use space shuttle components for the agency's next-generation rocket seemed like a terrible idea, given the challenges of working with hydrogen demonstrated over the previous three decades.

"They took finicky, expensive programs that couldn't fly very often, stacked them together differently, and said now, all of a sudden, it's going to be cheap and easy," she told Ars in August. "Yeah, we've flown them before, but they've proven to be problematic and challenging. This is one of the things that boggled my mind. What about it was going to change? I attribute it to this sort of group think, the contractors and the self-licking ice cream cone."

By now, I believe most folks know that the Artemis stack has to be rolled back to the VAB if for no other reason than to replace the batteries in the Flight Termination System (FTS).  Those are certified for 25 days which is expired now, and the system is apparently not accessible on the pad.  Today's update to the Artemis blog says:

After standing down on the Artemis I launch attempt Saturday, Sept. 3 due to a hydrogen leak, teams have decided to replace the seal on an interface, called the quick disconnect, between the liquid hydrogen fuel feed line on the mobile launcher and the Space Launch System (SLS) rocket while at the launch pad. 

This will require that an enclosure be built around the area they'll be working.  The enclosure will protect the hardware from the weather, but enable engineers to troubleshoot and test the system under the actual cryogenic conditions.  It's possible that while they'll be able to test under the most realistic conditions that some repairs or rework will need to be done in the VAB.

It's hard not to wonder if they're approaching some sort of limits on the amount of testing the vehicle can withstand.  Last Saturday's countdown - cancelled when the hydrogen tank was 11% filled - was the sixth time they've attempted to fuel this launch vehicle; it's tempting to call these tests a WDR (wet dress rehearsal) but I don't think they really accomplished enough to deserve that name.   

NASA's Space Launch System rocket at LC-39B last Thursday: September 1, 2022.  Trevor Mahlmann photo.

How much do you want to bet that the seventh time will be the charm?



22 comments:

  1. Sig, thank you for what you do. As a federal jobs program SLS appears to be working well. As a way to get back to the moon, not so much. I am not a rocket engineer but even I can see the crazy in all of this.

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  2. Maybe we should start calling them a "Moist Dress Rehearsal"?

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  3. Someone once said the definition of insanity is doing the same thing over and over again and expecting a different result.

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  4. Musk: Try, Fail, Try, Fail, Try, Fail, Win Win Win Win Win.
    NASA: Conference. Guess. Almost Fail. Conference. Almost Fail. Conference. Almost Fail. Scratch Head, Ask For More Funding.

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  5. The J-2, which is the base for the RS25/SSME, first took flight in 1966. So...

    Seriously, the Saturn used H2/O2. How friggin hard is it? It's a known system, known problems. Wert der ferk?

    And, no, it's going to be unlucky number 7, number 8, number 9... That dog ain't gonna hunt the way NASA is going.

    Valves... wonder who built the valves...

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    1. Yeah, but the guys who made Saturn and the STS work were all Boomers and (gasp!) older. They all retired. NASA said, "we have all those procedures we wrote; we don't need anybody around for hands-on training."

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    2. These same QDs, or QDs of the same design were used for all the vehicle testing at Stennis. All hardware that touches the vehicle is designed and manufactured by the center responsible for that portion of the vehicle and its contractors. That means those QDs were designed by MSFC and Boeing. Now they appear to have worked during the green run at Stennis. Centaur has been using LH2 for MANY years. And NONE of the procedures from Shuttle are being used for SLS. The vehicles are too different.

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    3. My guess is that the problem is that (late and over budget) mobile launch tower. There have been other issues reported that seem like they come from the tower, and there is the reality you mention that this system worked at Stennis. It worked twice if you include the test that didn't make full duration.

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    4. Forget about who built the valves...who wrote the software to command the wrong one to open? Or are these tests being done by hand?

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    5. And that's what made my head hurt. Not to mention if the software was written beforehand, why wasn't it tested ? If a couple of thousand bucks at retail radio can have software Quality Assurance that verifies everything does what it's supposed to do, why can't a four freaking billion dollar launch vehicle have it?

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    6. Sooooooo much fail. Over and over fail. Right now, Boeing's Starliner looks better than the SLS.

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    7. SIG: The tail service mast on the MLP is the interface to those QDs. There are flexhoses running from it to the QDs so they can be retracted at launch. There is still Quality Assurance out there, and Quality Engineering as well. Not sure what the current levels are, but for critical actions on Shuttle, BOTH NASA and contractor QA were required for the "buys". Understand, however, that the government is real big on "insight, not oversight" so the procedures do not require NASA approval at the detail level. And on the ground processing side, I'm not sure who the contractor is today. At the end of Shuttle, it was "United Space Alliance", which was a mandated combination of Lockheed-Martin and Rockwell(Boeing) at the direction of NASA Administrator Dan Goldin.

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    8. Thanks for the explanations, Mark. Honestly, I don't know that it makes it feel any better to me, but my reaction was like Malatrope's. are these tests being done by hand?

      I worked (in principle) one notch down from spaceflight hardware in avionics, commercial and military -- except for the times I worked on satellites for JPL and the TLAs. (Three Letter Agencies, not Acronyms). Even commercial aviation is very big on Software QA/QC. Every line of code was inspected, and every function was tested, so that things like commanding the wrong valve would not happen.

      I can't tell you the number of times I saw that requirements and the code were inspected but the software didn't do what it was supposed to.

      The contractor for the MLP was Bechtel. It was cost plus and predictably went over budget and late, eventually costing NASA almost $1 billion. I read at one time that NASA had reduced the amount of work they required out of Bechtel, specifically moving the umbilicals to another contractor - and kept paying Bechtel as if they were doing everything. I'm pretty sure this was for MLP-2 but I'm less sure it didn't involve MLP-1 as well.

      Pure, unmitigated, fustercluck.

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  6. Thanks heavens they found some old spare Shuttle SRB O-ring gaskets, which are just what they needed for the Artemis SRBs!

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    1. Do remember that even the Challenger O-rings would not have caused mission failure or vehicle loss with the current vehicle design.

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  7. Do I think try number 7 is going to be successful? Hell no.

    NASA needs to get out of the space launch business, period.

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  8. Jacobs has ML1. Bechtel has ML2. Jacobs was/is late in handing off ML1 designs to Bechtel. ML2 is over budget by $1.5B+. ML1 is over budget by 8 figures. ML2 is needed for Artemis 3 and later.

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    1. Thanks for that. The only name I had for ML1 was Vencore, but that article also said they were dropped as contractor in 2017 without mentioning who took over.

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  9. Vencore was the renamed QinetiQ North America.

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    1. QinetiQ? Apparently they were disappointed that most people could pronounce their name just by looking at it. Under somebody's model of modern business, a name has to be some random combination of letters never seen before.

      I'd guess that's pronounced "kinetic" but also under the rules of pronunciation, the one with the odd spelling pronounces it as they wish. That means it could be pronounced "Smith" if they wanted.

      The random collection of letters means while you're quietly cursing them under your breath, you're paying more attention to them and will remember the odd name better than Smith Co.

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  10. QinetiQ was the old dept. Q of MOD in the UK. Yes, Bond, James Bond. It was "privatised", then branched out into North America. That part was eventually sold off, and renamed Vencore. The remaining Vencore employees then went to Jacobs directly at the end of the QinetiQ/Vencore contract with a 30-35% cut in pay, or if skilled, they worked "Surge" for Jacobs in 6 month increments for 3 years at their old pay rates, before Surge subcontract was finally terminated at the time when Jacobs overrun had reached a 7 figure overrun. It's worse now.

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