Boeing's Space Launch System - There's Nothing Like It

There's nothing quite like it; so thank God in whatever way you can. 

There's nothing like it because there's nothing as bad as it is. Every report on every aspect of the Space Launch System (SLS) is worse than the one before it.  Every milestone is late. Every cost target is over budget. 

The latest is a report on the Exploration Upper Stage (EUS) and is the first I've seen on the EUS. We can be thankful that the Europa Clipper probe to that named moon of Jupiter was moved to a Falcon Heavy and is set for launch Oct 10, 2024. Part of the reason was the EUS was going to be delayed too long, but the White House, in the closing weeks of the Trump administration, had to get Congress to cancel the law they passed mandating Europa Clipper fly on the SLS. 

The NASA program to develop a new upper stage for the Space Launch System rocket is seven years behind schedule and significantly over budget, a new report from the space agency's inspector general finds. However, beyond these headline numbers, there is also some eye-opening information about the project's prime contractor, Boeing, and its poor quality control practices.

The new Exploration Upper Stage, a more powerful second stage for the SLS rocket that made its debut in late 2022, is viewed by NASA as a key piece of its Artemis program to return humans to the Moon. The current plan calls for the use of this new upper stage beginning with the second lunar landing, the Artemis IV mission, currently scheduled for 2028. In NASA parlance, the upgraded version of the SLS rocket is known as Block 1B.

Poor quality control? That new report focuses on Boeing's quality control practices at the Michoud Assembly Facility in southern Louisiana, where the Exploration Upper Stage is being manufactured. Federal observers have issued a striking number of "Corrective Action Requests" to Boeing. The report points out the root cause of these issues is that “Boeing’s quality control issues are largely caused by its workforce having insufficient aerospace production experience. The lack of a trained and qualified workforce increases the risk that the contractor will continue to manufacture parts and components that do not adhere to NASA requirements and industry standards.”

Not surprisingly, the "lack of a trained and qualified workforce" has resulted in more parts being rejected, causing more time wasted and more cost incurred. Based on readers who have commented here, I think this statement isn't going to surprise a single person:

According to the new report, "unsatisfactory" welding operations resulted in propellant tanks that did not meet specifications, which directly led to a seven-month delay in the program.

And I think nobody who has read much about SLS will be surprised by this follow-on.

NASA's inspector general was concerned enough with quality control to recommend that the space agency institute financial penalties for Boeing’s noncompliance. However, in a response to the report, NASA's deputy associate administrator, Catherine Koerner, declined to do so. "NASA interprets this recommendation to be directing NASA to institute penalties outside the bounds of the contract," she replied. "There are already authorities in the contract, such as award fee provisions, which enable financial ramifications for noncompliance with quality control standards."

The lack of enthusiasm by NASA to penalize Boeing for these issues will not help the perception that the agency treats some of its contractors with kid gloves.

The report estimates that the entire development of this Exploration Upper Stage will be over budget by $5.7 billion before it ultimately launches. The last time they revised their cost estimate was last December. Here we are just eight months after that estimate and they're already $700 million over that. 

In refusing to penalize Boeing for these quality issues, NASA and Deputy Associate Catherine Koerner are actually rewarding Boeing for these quality issues. This is a "cost plus" contract. It pays for all of Boeing's expenses, plus a fee. That style contract is incentivizing things like hiring the untrained and unqualified workforce. Need some welders? Go find some winos that have never been within 10 feet of a welding setup. If it takes more time and the stage needs to be scrapped and rebuilt - you make money on it instead of paying for it. 

NASA's Inspector General's report included this graphic showing the expected delivery date of the EUS from 2016 until last October. Notice that in October of 2016, the expected delivery was February of 2021. In March of '21, already late, the new expected delivery was October of '23. Every update of the chart moves the expected delivery out. 14 months later, in May of '22, the delivery had slipped 15 months to January of '25. Another 13 months later, June of '23, moved the delivery 14 months to March of '26. The last one is Even Worse. 

This is almost funny it's so incompetently bad. Almost. When I think about it, the humor leaves and anger takes its place.